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AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, THE VASIC HAND-GRENADE,
AND JUS AD BELLUM IN WORLD WAR ONE

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Abstract: Seventy years of historical orthodoxy has contended that Austria-Hungary had used the assassination of the heir to their throne, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, as an excuse to start a war against the Kingdom of Serbia, despite the absence of evidence linking the Serbian government to the crime. The purpose of this paper is to provide a fresh reexamination of all the evidence known to the Austrian-Hungarian government up to the moment of the declaration of war with Serbia, which may have implicated Serbia in the crime. This examination is provided in the context of international law, as it existed in 1914, in order to permit the reader to make an informed determination on the Austrian-Hungarian claim for Jus Ad Bellum, a just reason for war, or, conversely, to determine that the Entente Powers of France, Russia and Great Britain were justified in their intervention in the Austrian – Serbian war.

I INTRODUCTION

“For the aim of historians rarely is to present the absolute truth. Usually they wish to embellish the deeds of their army or to demonstrate the concordance of events with their imaginary rules. They invent history instead of writing it. ”
(Carl von Clausewitz, p. 68)

General Carl von Clausewitz, who penned the above quotation, is far more famous for his magnum opus, vom Krieg (On War). However, twenty four years earlier, while writing a delightfully simplified and shortened precursor, entitled Principals of War, he issued the damning indictment of historians, noted above. Put in simple terms, in Clausewitz's perspective, historians are about as slanted as the Leaning Tower of Pisa. Clausewitz contends that the “facts” that they present should be carefully and suspiciously examined by the reader, who should, in turn, develop their own opinions rather than relying on the historians' conclusions. It is, of course, to be remembered that Clausewitz was writing at a time when military and historical orthodoxies had been turned on their heads by the Corsican gentleman, Napoleon Bonaparte. So Clausewitz's ire and distrust are understandable.

Historians generally deserve far more mercy than that tendered by General von Clausewitz, but on the subject of the causes of the start of the First World War, it must be conceded that he has a point. Since the 1940's, modern historians have almost universally blamed one nation, Austria-Hungary, for initiating the First World War. To suggest any opinion to the contrary, borders on historical heresy. Seldom does one find such a long lasting, resilient and uncontested historical hypothesis. This contention has been sustained and perpetuated, over the years, by a number of factors, including bias, an over-dependence on secondary sources, and the failure to conduct a detailed examination of critical source data which would undermine current historical orthodoxy.

The purpose of this article is to offer a rebuttal to this modern historical thought. This will be done by providing the factual information which most, if not all, post-World War II modern historians overlook in their accounts regarding Austria Hungary's tacit claim to have had jus ad

bellum – a legitimate, legal cause to initiate a war. But, more importantly, rather than providing the author's pronouncement on the legitimacy of the Dual Monarchy's claim to jus ad bellum, this article presents the standards of international law, at the time of the assassination, and it leaves the final assessment of the claim to the reader. Hopefully, in this manner, not only will the truth be arrived at, but the just scorn of Clausewitz's ghost will be avoided.

A. THE PROBLEM

"You must be Miss Hope, the governess I've come to meet," said the apparition, in a tone that admitted of very little argument.

"Very well, if I must I must," said Lady Carlotta to herself with dangerous meekness.

"I am Mrs. Quabarl," continued the lady; "and where, pray, is your luggage?"

"It's gone astray," said the alleged governess, falling in with the excellent rule of life that the absent are always to blame; the luggage had, in point of fact, behaved with perfect correctitude. "I've just telegraphed about it," she added, with a nearer approach to truth. (Saki, 2015)

At the outset, it is particularly important to note that, until the start of the Second World War, historians had a decidedly different perspective on the start of the First World War. Consider this quote from a typical history book from the 1930's, "The Illustrated World History", jointly published by a British and an American historian, "While every friend of peace might well wish that Austria had accepted the terms of the Servian reply to her ultimatum, yet no one can with any propriety criticize her for not doing so. (Hammerton, J. & Barnes, H p. 984)

The reason for the striking, universal and complete reversal in historical opinion from the interwar historical norm, represented by Hammerton and Barnes is obvious – World War Two. After all, it would have devilishly hard to sell American War bonds and Victory stamps, for instance, with the slogan, "Yes, our allies did intentionally and deceitfully start the last World War, but, honest, they're on the level this time." Not surprisingly, historical perspectives change to reflect the needs of the society, and, in this instance, the lucid, practical, and reasoned viewpoint of the justifiable nature of Austria-Hungary's actions leading up to the start of the First World War were sacrificed to the political expedience of winning the Second World War. As the ancient Greek playwright, Aeschylus, noted, "In war, truth is the first casualty". (Moncur, 2015)

Further, after the war, the needs of western foreign policy continued this uniform assessment of blame, which is also quite understandable. The Germans and British, who were the European backbone of the NATO Alliance, had to be mollified. The on-again off-again ally, France, had to be constantly placated. Further, the instigation of offense with the hyper-sensitive Russian nemesis, by pointing the finger of blame in that direction, also had to be avoided. Most importantly, Tito's Yugoslavia, ruled primarily by and for the Serbs, had to be appeased to keep the aforementioned Russians out of the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, Austria-Hungary, like the fictional Lady Carlotta's luggage, made a perfect scapegoat by virtue of its absence.

This is not to say that that this was, necessarily, a conscious or intentional bias. But historians, being human, are products of their time. Current diplomatic and political imperatives inevitably bleed into a historical work. What is surprising, however, is that the post-war political necessities that perpetuated the assessment of blame against Austria-Hungary, disappeared twenty five years ago, along with the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. However, the adjudication of Austria-Hungary as having started World War One remain unchanged and unchallenged from 1939 onward. Well, at least, these assessments of blame have not been challenged, until now.

B. THE QUESTION: AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND JUS AD BELLUM

In the briefest terms possible, Austria-Hungary went to war to deal with Serbia, for what it held to be a series of ongoing, overt acts of war, culminating in the murder of Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne. The rest of Europe, allegedly, went to war based upon the alliance system. Russia, France, and England went to war, ostensibly, to protect Serbia. The Germans went to war to support Austria-Hungary.

So the question devolves to one singular decision point.

- Did Austria-Hungary have satisfactory, demonstrable Jus Ad Bellum, or a just reason for war, or
- Were the Allies justified in their intervention to protect Serbia?

The question is not an idle one. Tens of millions of people, from around the world, died in the resulting 1st World War, the directly related 2nd World War, and many subsequent wars to the present day.

II THE EVIDENCE

A. THE NON-WARNING

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”

“To the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime.”

“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”

“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes. (Doyle, Silver Blaze, p. 289)

On 21 June 1914, Jovan Jovanovic, the Serbian Ambassador to Vienna, met with Leon Ritter von Bilinski, the Civil Governor of Bosnia, and suggested Franz Ferdinand should not go on his planned trip to Sarajevo, because this might stir up unrest, and that the Serbia could not be held responsible for any resulting complications. (Albertini, Volume 2, p.102)

A rather brief, nondescript and modest pronouncement, to be sure, but, the question is, was this an adequate warning of the coming assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The Italian historian Luigi Albertini's book, the “The Origins of the War of 1914”, not only contends that this constituted a satisfactory warning but makes, what appears to be, a very tenuous extrapolation. Since Bilinski ignored the “warning”, contends Albertini's book, Austria-Hungary must bear equal responsibility with Serbia, for the flashpoint that ignited the war. (Albertini Volume 2, p.105)

Albertini, a professional journalist and editor, is considered by most modern historians to be the dean of World War One chroniclers, the wellspring of all wisdom and knowledge on the subject. As John Keegan, the author of *The First World War*, put it, “The bedrock of all discussion remains L. Albertini’s *The Origins of the War of 1914*”. (Albertini Volume 2) Frankly, a brief review of the citations in this paper will indicate that he is repeatedly called upon to provide information, here, as well. Signor Albertini's presents the facts in an extraordinarily detailed manner. His inclusion of the thorough review of Serbia's disingenuous response to Austrian demands is concise, damning, and seldom found elsewhere. It is also strangely at odds with the rash, unsupportable conclusion, on Austrian war guilt, mentioned above. (Albertini, Volume 2, p.364-371) There is simply a disconnect, which is manifestly explicable, between the elegant array of facts Albertini presents us with, and the somewhat distorted conclusions found in his book.

One thing has to be kept in mind, however, and it appears to be lost on most historians who cite Italy's answer to Edward R. Murrow. Luigi Albertini's book was published posthumously. As the modern historian T. G. Otte notes, Albertini relied heavily on the dubious Italian journalist, Luciano Margrini, who is charitably characterized as having “pronounced pro-Serb, proclivities”. (Otte 2014, p. 226) While it is true that Albertini was elected Senator in the Royal Italian government in 1914, had openly supported Italy's unwarranted and disastrous entry into WWI a year later and, therefore, had a multitude of reasons to be biased in his assessments, it would be monumentally unfair to blame him for the highly illogical contentions his book eventually adopted, after his demise. (Britanica.com, 2014)

1. The Problem with the Non-Warning

There are more concrete problems with opinion of Albertini's book regarding the satisfactory quality of the warning. Ambassador Jovanovic actually had been given explicit instructions by his government, to warn the Austrians of an existing assassination plot. Instead, Jovanovic delivered an incredibly vague suggestion to a secondary minister. The explanation for this dereliction of duty is simple: The Serb Ambassador was one of those, in his country, who wanted war with Austria, and, thus, foiling the assassination was not an imperative to him. (Albertini, Volume 2, p 106)

Of course, the Austrians were not privy to the instructions from Serbia. But, consider the deed itself, that Jovanovic willfully chose to deliver the message to the least likely and least well-equipped person in the Austrian-Hungarian government to receive it. That, in and of itself, would mitigate against the “warning” being taken seriously.

Because Jovanovic did not take this matter up with the Foreign Minister, the Austrian Chancellor, or even the Austrian Emperor, naturally, Bilinski discounted the indefinite expression of caution. If the Serb Ambassador really knew something was afoot, surely he would take it through formal diplomatic channels to the highest authorities in the realm? Thus, Bilinsky, the Finance Minister, and, as an afterthought, civil governor of Bosnia, obviously had ample grounds to dismiss the visit by Jovanovic, as a brief and unproductive interlude with a self important pest, and he returned to his primary duties of balancing the imperial books. Which, one

presumes, was precisely what Jovanovic wanted. The Austrians would, unfortunately, learn the specifics that Jovanovic had omitted in his non-warning, just one week later.

2. Was it a Warning – Even the Serbs Can't Decide

If the readers of this article are still undecided whether or not Jovanovic's statement constituted an actual warning to the Austrian Government regarding the imminent assassination of Franz Ferdinand, they are not alone. The Serbian government, itself, could not decide whether this constituted a warning. Immediately after the assassination, the two most important Serb ambassadors, those in France and Russia, proudly proclaimed that their government had warned Austria-Hungary of the pending assassination attempt. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 100–01)

The Serbs, realizing the catastrophic implication of those claims, and what they could lead to, quickly walked back these statements. Prime Minister Pasic would deny, on July 7th, and thereafter, of having any knowledge of the assassination attempt. So, how could he have warned anyone of anything? (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 99)

Certainly, all of this, the non-warning warning, the claim of a warning, and the subsequent denial of any knowledge, whatsoever, that would have permitted a warning, all looked very suspicious to the Austrian government. The upshot of all this would have been to demonstrate to Austria-Hungary that Serbia had substantial pre-knowledge of the attack. Of course, Albertini demonstrated, with his trademark thoroughness, the authoritative intelligence Belgrade possessed prior to the attack. (Albertini, Volume 2, 97-98) Speaking of which:

B. THE ASSASSINATION

As the reader knows, Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, was shot dead, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914. He had gone to Bosnia to oversee the Imperial & Royal Army's annual military exercises. For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to go into an extensive review of the crime. The events of that bright June morning have been recited, repeatedly, over the years. What is important to note, however, is the complexity of the affair and the diverse accounts that are provided to the public. Some histories only mention the actual assassin Gavrilo Princip, who is, by omission, presumed to be a lone gunman, and is universally described as using a “revolver”.

Other accounts do mention a second assassin, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, who had attempted to attack the imperial couple earlier in the morning, with what is called a “bomb”. {and who, comically, attempted to effectuate his escape by diving headlong into the mud of the nearly dried up Miljacka River} Only the most detailed histories reveal that there were seven assassins involved. The reason for this omission is obvious. One or two assassins are easily dismissed as malcontent students; Seven assassins manifest prima facia evidence of an organized conspiracy. (McMeekin, 2013, p12)

C. PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF SERB INVOLVEMENT

It is a capital mistake to theorize in advance of the facts. (Doyle, The Adventure of the Second Stain, p. 572)

The British Historian, A J P Taylor, asserted in his book, "The Mastery of Europe" that Austria had no evidence, whatsoever, of the Serb involvement in the assassination. (Taylor, p.521) Unfortunately, many historians take this pronouncement as gospel, and as a result, do not bother to check what physical evidence the Dual Monarchy actually possessed. Leaving aside the obvious tangibility of the promptly arrested six conspirators, (out of the total of seven) it is still manifestly easy to take exception with Taylor's claim. Within one week of the assassination, the Austrian authorities had amassed 5.968 kilograms (13 lbs 2 oz) of evidence, pointing directly to the involvement of the Serbian government in the crime.

1. The Grenades

Remember, that the first attack on Franz Ferdinand, was undertaken with a "bomb", about an hour before the shooting of the Archduke. After its unsuccessful, but explosive, employment, obviously, there was nothing substantive left to examine or identify. Fortunately the other conspirators, were quickly captured and remedied this deficiency by providing 5 other "bombs", identical to the one used in the failed assassination attempt by Cabrinovic.

Of course, by now, the reader will have noticed the quotation marks that attend each and every usage of the word "bomb", including this one. That is because the description, "bomb" is universally applied by post-World War II modern historians, whether out of a desire to cite respected sources, or, possibly, simple laziness in not carefully studying the original source documentation, such as the Austrian Red Book. For whatever reason, however, they insist on calling the explosive device used by Cabrinovic, and the explosives carried by five other conspirators, as "bombs". (Cassels, p.148), (McMeekin, p.8) and (Morton, p.249)


The items seized by the Austrians authorities, from the conspirators, however, were easily described in a far more precise manner. These "bombs" were, in fact, 5 Vasic, Model M12 (for 1912) Hand Grenades. (World Heritage Encyclopedia 2014) The interesting point is that Vasic grenades were manufactured in only one country in the entire world and for only one entity – The Kingdom of Serbia manufactured these grenades exclusively for the Royal Serbian Army.

This is the concrete, undeniable physical evidence that clearly links the Serbian government to the attack, and absolutely contradicts AJP Taylor. Despite the fact that these items were clearly identified by the Austrian government, in the Demarche's annex, as Serbian Army issued hand grenades, historians continue to use the misleading and vague term, "bomb". (BYU, 2009)

The importance of this distinction can hardly be overstated. It would be extremely difficult to implicate any government with a nondescript "bomb". While not conclusive, six Serbian government manufactured hand grenades are still compelling, material, corroborative evidence of the direct involvement of the Serbian government in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, which would shortly be confirmed by the confessions of the assassins. As noted above, this precise distinction is also routinely omitted from virtually all books written on the start of the First World War.

For the reader's reference, these munitions are also called Kragujevac grenades, after the town, in Serbia, where they were manufactured. The grenades taken in Sarajevo were an improved version of the original 1903 grenade that was developed by Colonel Vasic, who was also the secretary of the Black Hand organization, an enterprise which will be covered later, in greater detail. (World Heritage Encyclopedia, 2014) (Batakovic, p. 325)

The Vasic/Kragujevac series of hand grenades was unique in the annals of warfare. Hand-grenades are almost universally symmetrical in design – being spheroid, ellipsoid or cylindrical. Naturally, this is done to maximize the dispersal of the shrapnel propelled by the explosive charge.



But, the Vasic/Kragujevac grenade, as you can see from the pictures, above, is asymmetrical. (K. u. K. Technisches Militär-Komitee, 1917) (ORF, 2009) It is shaped like a large whiskey flask. It was designed to be more useful to terrorists and guerillas, for its concealable shape, than for the use of soldiers, who would desire greater explosive effectiveness.

But, the curiosities of this blatantly omitted weapon do not even terminate at this point. Consider, that this was the very first munition employed in the “War to End All Wars”. Reason dictates that it should be in every history book, and prominently displayed in historical museums, world-wide, if not for its primacy, certainly for its infamy. Yet, the author of this article is extremely confident that the historically knowledgeable reader, has never heard of the Vasic/Kragujevac hand grenade, nor has ever seen a picture of it. If this grenade was any more obscure, the Vasic/Kragujevac M-12 would qualify as a stealth weapon.

One trusts that this ignorance of Vasic/Kragujevac also extends to the modern historians, who universally insist upon using the indistinct term, “bomb”, instead of a more precise, and far more damning description of Serbian Army hand grenade. For their reference (and yours) further drawings and photographs of this weapon are available from the website:

<http://www.lexpev.nl/grenades/sovietbalkan/sfryugoslavia/kragujevac.html> which is virtually the only place, online, where such images can be seen.

It must be conceded, however, that the modern historians' claims of Austria-Hungary starting the First World War, without evidence of Serb involvement, would be decidedly undermined if these latter-day chroniclers had to call those “bombs”, Serbian Army issued hand grenades. If you add to that fact, the design, which favored assassinations, and the large number of grenades found on the assassins, credulity would be severely tested. Frankly, the modern historian, would look positively absurd if they pursued such their argument of a lack of evidence, with any vigor, in the face of these facts.

Previously, it was suggested that these grenades constituted willful intent of Serbia, a point which requires elaboration. It is worth noting that the Serbian Karageorgevic monarchy and Serbian Radical political party, both of whom were in power in 1914, had obtained their positions through a violent, murderous, bloodthirsty coup in 1903. Also remember, Colonel Vasic, who participated in, and benefited handsomely from, that coup, immediately set about producing his clandestine weapon, with the encouragement of the new junta. (World Heritage Encyclopedia, 2014) (Batakovic, p.325) The inescapable conclusion is that the Serbs, from the very onset of the new regime, had intended to carry out terrorist attacks and/or conduct illegal guerrilla warfare operations, to expand their territory at the expense of their neighbors, using grenades that were specifically designed for that purpose.

Of course, such weapons require end users and the Kingdom of Serbia was awash in them, individuals who used these weapons and tactics with ruthless effectiveness, in the just concluded First and Second Balkan Wars. Just as an example, Major Voje Tankosic, whose significant role in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand will be documented shortly, was the commandant of a school training comitadji, or guerillas, in Cuprija, Serbia, in 1908. This school was established, specifically, to train these individuals to conduct operations in Austria-Hungary. (Austrian Red Book, Vol. 2 page 51 & 54). Edith Durham reports that Serb Komitadji(sic) bands were operating in Montenegro in 1907, and attempted to overthrow the ruling Prince Nicola Petrovic. And what were these Comitadji armed with? You guessed it, Kragujevac Serbian Army issued hand-grenades. (Durham, 1920) Thus, illegal guerrilla warfare was an established, long-standing, documented, modus operendi for the Serbian regime. And the weapon of choice for these criminal combatants was the Vasic-Kragujevac grenade.

2. The Pistols

Naturally, the Bosnian Gendarmerie actually began the collection of physical evidence, later in the morning of June 28, 1914, when they snatched a Model 1910 Browning Semiautomatic Pistol, out of the hand of the shooter, Gavrilo Princip. (Dundas, 2014) It was not a non-descript, cheap “revolver”, as historians have repeatedly called it. Embarrassingly, one historian even included a picture of the Browning semiautomatic in their book, and yet still managed to call it a revolver. (McMeekin, 2013 p.8)

To the reader, the delineation may seem to be trivial. Why is the type of pistol important? One must remember, at that time, that the Browning 1910 was the most expensive, and most modern, magazine fed, self-loading pistol available in Europe. Succinctly put, this was the state of the art, top notch, latest word, in pistols. In subsequent arrests, 3 more identical 1910 Browning's were involuntarily provided by other conspirators, who were jailed over the next three days. (Moore, et al, p.758) Significantly, as Moore shows, the contemporary American news media, were able to easily identify the Browning pistols.

Even the densest investigator would have to question where these dirty, poor “students” obtained the money to buy four copies of one of the most expensive handguns in the world. Unless Princip joined the Belgrade Pistol of the Month Club, the possession of those very expensive pistols by these impoverished malcontents, would again strain the credulity of the most obtuse observer.

It is at this point, that the information on the pistols becomes, at once, more contradictory, and possibly more damning for the Serbs. Several sources, of which, two are cited here, indicate that the Browning 1910 had just been adopted by the Serbian Army for its new issued sidearm. (Shackelford, 2010) (Peterson, p.491)

Honesty requires, however, the admission that other sources contend that the Serbs had not adopted the Browning at this time, and would not do so until the pistol design was updated in 1922. {Admitting that sources are in conflict on this issue, due consideration must be given to Peterson's contention that Browning was a Serbian Army issued side arm, at the time of the assassination. He is a published gun expert, and his livelihood is directly dependent on the accuracy of his compendiums.} Since there is a divergence of opinion on this point, however, it will not be insisted upon.

But, in contrast to Mr. Peterson's contention on the Browning pistols, the reader is asked to consider the gross inaccuracy applied to the subject of the assassins' weapons, by modern historians, whenever the Sarajevo affair has been reported. They cavalierly transfigure Vasic/Kragujevac hand-grenades into “bombs” and Browning semi-automatics into “revolvers”. Consider, also, by way of comparison, the Mannlicher Carcano bolt action rifle used in the fifty year old Kennedy assassination, which, by the way, did not presage a world war. (Warren Commission, 1964) Any historian who applied such a level of inaccuracy, as describing the Kennedy murder weapon as a shot gun or an assault weapon, would be derided into obscurity. So the reader is requested to entertain the possibility of the assassination pistols being Serbian army issued side-arms, until a clear, concrete, and absolutely irrefutable denial or confirmation of the assertion is rendered. {The author of this article emailed Fabrique Nationale in Belgium, the pistol's manufacturer, wholesaler, and, presumably, the holder of the original source documents, to inquire on the matter. Considering that they manufactured the most notorious pistol in human history, however, it is not a total surprise that the email received no response.}

Obviously, it would be a striking coincidence, which certainly would not have been lost upon the Austrians, if four Serbian Army issued pistols had been employed by the Sarajevo assassins. Nevertheless, what the Austrian Authorities absolutely did have were four immaculately new pistols, with nearly sequential serial numbers,. Just for the reference of modern historians, who

might want to try to get this right in the future, the serial numbers for the four pistols were 19074, {Princip's} 19075, 19120, and 19126. (Kavanaugh, 2014) It is the author's understanding that Fabrique National started production with the serial number 10,000. Thus, out of sizable production run of 9126 pistols manufactured, the four pistols involved in the assassination had a diminutive distribution of 52 digits in their serial numbers.

This clearly pointed to a well funded, external organization, which could purchase these pistols in bulk, as being the source of these weapons and, thus, being author of the assassination in Sarajevo. Certain observations seem to be in order, at this point. The only such organization that had the means to acquire the pistols and motive to carry out this attack was the Serbian government, leaving them as the focus of suspicion. The half dozen Serbian army grenades issued to the assassins, almost certainly confirms this suspicion. Finally, just in passing, a sarcastic person might observe that these “young university student” assassins were better equipped than the average Serbian Army Officer.

3. The Confessions

As you would imagine, between the mountain of physical evidence pointing toward an obvious supplying entity, the Serbian Royal Government, and the extreme seriousness of the charges, it was not long before the arrested assassins began implicating Serbian officials. Cabrinovic, the grenade thrower, and Princip, the shooter, both admitted to getting the pistols and 150 Dinars in cash support, in Belgrade, from Major Tankosic of the Serbian Royal Army. They both said Tankosic introduced them to a Serbian bureaucrat named Milan Ciganovic, who trained them in shooting and who provided the grenades. Finally another Serbian Army Major, named Popovic, provided fake identity papers to permit the assassins to cross the border into Austria-Hungary. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 92-94) Thus, in early July, the Austrians possessed substantial physical evidence of direct Serbian army and government involvement, documented and corroborated by independent confessions.

4. The Significance of the Evidence – What it Wasn't and What it Was.

Herein lies a conundrum. What was truly significant wasn't the weapons that were used, per se. What was truly significant was the weapons that were not used. The judge, who arraigned the assassins in late June and early July, knew the Vasic-Kragujevac hand-grenades on first sight. The year before, in 1913, the same judge had handled an inquiry where 21 such hand-grenades had been smuggled into the town of Breka, Bosnia, in their original packing from the Serbian Royal Arsenal. (Austrian Red Book, Vol. 2, p.93) Surely, the Serbian government officials who procured these distinctive grenades would realize how easily identifiable they were.

This begs the question, how hard would it have been to have provided the assassins with improvised explosives, which could never be identifiable as Serbian Army weapons. According to Albertini, the Serb Prime Minister Pasic feared that Major “Tankosic's factory for making bombs and explosives would produce threats to peace”. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 107) The Serb army officer and guerrilla trainer was, apparently, in a position to have made improvised explosives made for the assassins.

Likewise, allowing that the pistols taken from the conspirator's were Serbian Army issue, any moderately well informed Austrian-Hungarian official would have easily identifiable them as such. Leaving that aside, the brand new, expensive, batch-purchased set of pistols pointed back toward the Serbian government, which was the most likely, if not only, organization with the means and the motive to have obtained these weapons for the assassins.

However, it is to be noted, Serbia had been a client state of Austria-Hungary, until the violent 1903 Coup placed that country firmly, and conveniently, in the Russian sphere of influence. As a result, the Serbs had hundreds of old Austrian Gasser revolvers lying around in Serbian Royal Army arsenals, which could have also been used in the assassination. (Peterson, p.491) It would have been the incarnation of simplicity to have filed down the serial numbers, and thus, avoided any traceable connection to Serbia. Meanwhile, the Austrians were no longer using this pistol, themselves, so the assassins' pistols would have been presumed to have been surplus or stolen.

The question is begged, why would the assassins be given weapons that could be so easily traced back to Serbia? Obviously, therefore, it is a reasonable conclusion that the person behind the assassination wanted Serbia to look guilty, which brings us to:

III MOTIVE

A. THE PERSON BEHIND THE ASSASSINATION.

Ah, me! it's a wicked world, and when a clever man turns his brains to crime it is the worst of all. (Doyle, The Adventure of the Speckled Band, p. 220)

At this time, an introduction to Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic is in order. He remained unknown, or, at least, unmentioned, by the assassins, and, therefore, his role as instigator of the Sarajevo outrage also remained unknown to the Austrian-Hungarian authorities. Thus, he did not figure into the Austrian decisions and demands on Serbia in July 1914. However, his high position and low malfeasance definitely affected the conduct of the Serbian government and motivated them to brook war with their northern neighbor, rather than permit his discovery. As Prime Minister Pasic wrote, four days before the assassination. "All our allies and friends of Serbia, if they knew what our officers and sergeants are doing, would not only abandon us, they would stand on the side of Austria-Hungary and allow her to punish her restless and disloyal neighbor". (Clark, p.53)

Dimitrijevic was definitely a busy little bee, directing all those officers and sergeants into what Prime Minister Pasic considered to be treasonable activities. (Clark, p.42) Dimitrijevic was the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence, reporting directly to the Serbian Royal Army Chief of Staff. But he was also chairman of the Black Hand Terrorist Organization. (Albertini p. 25-27) It was Dimitrijevic, who approved the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by our well armed Serbian assassins. The Black Hand has been described in many ways over the years, from patriotic group to terrorist organization. But the most accurate description of this organization has never been used. The Black Hand was, in fact, the black operations group of the Serbian Royal Army.

Admittedly, that is a contentious assertion, and it has certainly never crossed the mind nor the keyboard of the modern historian. But consider, for a moment, that almost all of the members of the Black Hand were Serbian military officers, including the Serbian Army chief of staff and the previously mentioned Colonels Vasic and Dimitrijevic, the ubiquitous Major Tankosic and Major Popovic. Even the most ardent and biased defenders of Serbia concede that the Black Hand was a military organization largely comprised of senior army officers, (Batakovic, p.326) It was, quite simply, a secret organization that was designed to do things internally, in Serbia, and abroad, that the Serbian military wanted to be done, but, did not want ascribed to the Serbian military or government. This is the assessment of the Carnegie International Commission on the Balkan Wars, which identified the Black Hand by name, and stated that “The worst crimes were committed by this secret organization” and “It was of distinct advantage for the regular government to have under its hand an irresponsible power which, like this, soon became all powerful, and which could always be disowned if necessary.” (Carnegie, p.169) Thus, the Black Hand meets the dictionary definition, quite literally, of a black operations group. (Dictionary.com 2015)

B. GOALS OF THE ASSASSINATION

But turning back to Dimitrijevic, as the leader of the Black Hand, he had ambitions. First he wanted the military to remain in completely in control of the country, as it had been for the last decade. The cowed Serb civil government, in opposition to the proto-fascist Black Hand, was trying to assert some modest form of independence from the military. The power play between the two forces came to a head over a seemingly childish and ridiculous dispute over the Serbian Royal priority decree, giving precedence to civil authorities in seating arrangements in government ceremonies. (Batakovic,2013, p.337) This comic opera game of musical chairs concealed a brutal power play, and reverting to form, Dimitrijevic attempted to organize an abortive coup against the civil government in the newly conquered province of Macedonia. (Batakovic,2013, p.339) As a result, Dimitrijevic was in a precarious position, and a crisis with Austria-Hungary would substantially strengthen his hand.

On a strategic level Dimitrijevic and his compatriots envisaged a “Yugoslavia” where all Slavic peoples, from the Greek border to the Alps, would be ruled by Serbia, versus a Greater Serbia, desired by the opponents of the Serbian Military, where all ethnic Serbs would be united under rule from Belgrade. (Batakovic,2013, p.326) The latter goal, a Greater Serbia, desired by the civil government, could easily have been achieved through diplomacy. The former goal, a Yugoslavian nation, desired by Dimitrijevic with the upper echelons of the Serb military, and, thus, the Black Hand, meant war with Austria-Hungary. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 25-27)

Finally, and obviously, because of the pro-Slavic reforms favored by Franz Ferdinand, which would doom Dimitrijevic's dream of the Yugoslav nation, he wanted the heir to the Austrian throne dead. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 87)

Based on the evidence we have covered, therefore, Dimitrijevic apparently decided to kill several birds with one stone. He would have Franz Ferdinand assassinated and leave just a little evidence to intimate Serbian involvement in the crime, without being conclusive, in order to provoke a military response by Austria-Hungary, which, in turn, would lead to the intervention of Russia and its allies. Whether war or peace was the result of this engineered crisis, the Serbia Civil

Government would be brought to heel, and back under the boot heel, of the Serbian Army. While Dimitrijevic's motives are, of course, educated speculation, we do know he initiated the attack through the Black hand and he apparently cleared the assassination through the Russian Military Attache, General Artamonov. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 80 & 83)

Naturally, this wasn't too big of a gamble. If the Austrians didn't have enough evidence to justify a war, or did not take Dimitrijevic's bait, he had still eliminated the single greatest threat to his dream of Pan-Serbism. He still had his malevolent plaything, the Black Hand black operations group, to engineer his eventual goal of bloodshed, insurrection, and eventual conquest of Croatia and Slovenia.

Of course, the one thing that Dimitrijevic didn't plan on was the assassins being captured, en masse, or, worse yet, talking. One or two could be dismissed, easily, but six captured assassins would have been embarrassing, and if they talked, potentially catastrophic. With an eye toward preventing loquaciousness amongst their dispatched henchmen, the Black Hand provided the assassins with suicide capsules. (McMeekin 2013, p.120) Unfortunately for Colonel Dimitrijevic's plan, the cyanide pills didn't work, and his imprisoned minions began singing to the officials in Sarajevo like Mafia stool pigeons.

IV POST ASSASINATION DIPLOMACY

At this point, it is vital to review where things stood on Thursday, July 2, 1914, five days after the assassination, and, importantly, before Austria-Hungary took any diplomatic action. The Austrian Authorities knew of the non-warning issued by Jovanovic, and the claims of the senior Serbian ambassadors, that their nation had provided a warning, all of which indicated advanced knowledge of the crime. The Austrian Authorities arrested a total of six out of seven armed terrorists carrying Serbian Army hand grenades, suspiciously brand new pistols or both. The Austrian Authorities obtained initial confessions, from both of the attackers, Cabrinovic and Princip, implicating two Serbian Army Majors, Tankosic and Popovic, and the bureaucrat Ciganovic, as having supplied the weapons, training, and resources to commit the crime. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 106-107) The physical evidence corroborated the confessions. This is more than satisfactory evidence to support the contention, that a reasonable person would conclude that a crime had been committed (e.g. Conspiracy to Commit Murder) and that the Serbian officials indicated above had participated in the crime. This more than meets the standard for arrests and search warrants under current United States law. (Findlaw.com, 2015) This, also, would have overawed the standard of evidence, in the year of our consideration, 1914, and certainly would have exceeded the standards for search and arrest warrants in the most civilized nations in Europe.

The only problem that the government of Austria-Hungary faced, is that the conspiracy originated, and the remaining conspirators resided, within the territorial protection of Serbia. Thus, a search or arrest warrant would be useless. An appeal to Serbia to perform its duties under international law was the only avenue open to Austria-Hungary, which is exactly what the government in Vienna immediately pursued.

A. THE REQUESTS FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND THEIR REFUSAL.

Two days after the assassination, on Tuesday, June 30th, 1914, while the evidence was building against Serbia, Baron Giesl, the Austrian-Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, informally asked the Serb Foreign Minister Slavko Gruic, to begin an investigation into the matter. Minister Gruic's response was, however, decidedly formal and official. Gruic refused to investigate the assassination, stating, "The matter does not concern the Serbian Government." At the utterance of this statement, "high words" as Albertini politely puts it, were exchanged. (Albertini. Volume 2, p. 273)

Over the next 8 days, repeated, formal, requests were made by the Austrian and German governments to both the Serbian Government, directly, and through the Russian Government, indirectly, for the commencement of an investigation into the Serbian origins the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. At every point, these requests were rejected, out of hand. (McMeekin 2013 p. 56-57)

B. AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN HIGH COUNCIL OF MINISTER'S MEETING & THE DEMARCHE

On 8 July 1914, ten days after the assassination, a high council of ministers meeting was held in Vienna, with the Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold, Army Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf, Austrian Chancellor Graf Karl von Stuerck and Hungarian Chancellor Count Stephan Tisza, all in attendance. They decided on several points (McMeekin, 2013, p.110-12)

- Formulate Demands to Serbia, to be delivered in a Demarche,
 - The terms would be stern, but not impossible, to fulfill.
 - If these demands were met, all is well.
- If not, Austria-Hungary would issue a formal ultimatum.
- If that was not met, Austria-Hungary would have no choice but to declare war.

1. Austrian-Hungarian War Aims

The Hungarian Chancellor, Count Tisza, insisted, vehemently, against any absorption of Serb territory into the Dual Monarchy, out of concern that an additional Slavic population would further weaken the influence of the Hungarians. The council of ministers eventually yielded. They recommended to, and gained Kaiser Franz Joseph's approval for, the proposed actions that would proceed against Serbia, but, if war occurred, no portion of that kingdom would be annexed into the Austrian-Hungarian empire. Serbia might be diminished in territory, to the benefit of their Balkan neighbors. (particularly in the area of Albanian Kosovo and Bulgarian Macedonia). But Serbia would continue as an independent kingdom, and Austria-Hungary would not take any of its territory. (McMeekin 2013 p. 110, 140)

Even in the face of this clear renunciation of territorial gain at the expense of the Serbs, some post-World War II modern historians experience no reticence in contriving war aims for the Austrians. For instance, the author of the Guns of August complacently opined "Austria-Hungary with the bellicose frivolity of senile empires, determined to use the occasion to absorb Serbia as she had absorbed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909". (Tuchman, p85) McMeekin, at least, attempts to

apply some scholarship to the subject. While admitting the adamant opposition of Count Tisza, the Hungarian Chancellor, to any annexation of Serb territory, he also cites an insinuation from Feldmarschall Conrad Graf von Hötendorf, the Austrian-Hungarian Army's Chief of Staff that the decision not to annex Serbian territory would not stand. (McMeekin, 2013, p141)

That being said, supported by citations or not, the contention that Austria-Hungary sought to acquire Serbia is still absurd. Modern historians seem to forget that Austria-Hungary championed full independence for Serbia, in the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, or that the Dual Monarchy risked war with Russia to protect Serbia in the Bulgarian War of 1885. (Otte. p.170)

Further, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold had trumped any thought of annexation by directly communicating through his ambassadors to the Entente governments, the guarantees of future Serbian independence and geographic integrity. As the British Foreign Office recorded, Count Mensdorf, the Austrian ambassador, directly informed the British Foreign Minister Grey that “the Austrian-Hungarian government had no intention of Territorial aggrandizement in Servia, or of impairing the sovereign rights of that country.” Ambassador Mensdorf also rejected French claims that Austria-Hungary would re-occupying the Sanjak of Novi Basaar, which separated Serbia from Montenegro, and which had been ceded by Austria in the Bosnian Crisis of 1909. (British Foreign Office, p. 260, p. 247: The Foreign Office is responsible for the unique spelling in the quotes.) If Austria-Hungary attempted to renege on this pledge, postbellum, they would provoke the allied powers into the war that their pledge was intended to forestall, and would likely lose the support of their German ally, just as a bonus.

Also, the modern historian somehow manages to forget that Austria-Hungary was not ruled by Foreign Minister Berchtold in the Ballplatz, nor von Hötendorf from the Kriegsministerium, but by the old gentleman in the Hofburg palace. His Imperial and Royal Majesty, Franz Joseph, had been leading his nation since before his current ministers had been born. He was extremely unlikely to be pushed around by them.

This brings us to an inherent contradiction of two competing contentions, both fostered by modern historians, but, neither possible of reconciliation with the other. On the one hand, they berate the old Kaiser, Franz Joseph, for his commitment to Dualism to the benefit of the Hungarians, in the face of all sorts of opposition. (Taylor, p. 516 – 517) In fact, Franz Joseph even persevered in supporting dualism in the face of Hungarian opposition. When a Magyar separatist movement broke out in 1903, and threatened to become a rebellion, Franz Joseph only approved the most limited plans to restore order and protect the dualistic status quo. (Rothenberg, p. 135) It has been suggested that Tisza and the Magyars intransigence controlled policy, not only in Vienna, but also in Berlin, where the German Kaiser held the Hungarian Chancellor in the highest regard. (Taylor p.516)

On the other hand, however, we are supposed to believe Kaiser Franz Joseph was going to be chivied about by his politicians and ministers into betraying the Hungarians' interests, and would incorporate millions more Slavs into his monarchy, against the Magyars' strong objections. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 141) Franz Joseph was neither servant to the Hungarians, nor his ministers. He was dedicated solely to preserving the delicate multinational balance in his empire, The notion that Franz Joseph would discard 47 years of considered political policy to make his army chief of staff happy is ludicrous.

Further, a cursory review of Edith Durham's description of the Austrian-Hungarian pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the "Twenty Years of the Balkan Tangle" demonstrates that the Dual Monarchy was lavishing every available Kronen and Heller (Austrian-Hungarian versions of the dollar and the penny) on the material improvement of the lives of the people of Bosnia. (Durham, 1920) Since Austria-Hungary first occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, it had lavished \$250 Million on the province, which it could ill afford, to provide roads, schools, and public works. (Moore, et al p.757) This is well over \$5 Billion in modern US currency.

How much more effort and expense would be required to bring an annexed Serbia into some approach toward civilization and the twentieth century, is not only beyond imagining, it would have certainly been beyond the resources of the Imperial and Royal treasury. The contention of modern historians that Dual Monarchy wanted to absorb Serbia ignores the simple facts that Austria did not have the money, and Hungary did not have inclination, to support the incorporation of the Kingdom of Serbia into their empire.

2. The Austrian-Hungarian Demarche

Based upon the decision of the high council, the Austrian-Hungarian government presented the Demarche to Serbia on Thursday, July 23, 1914. They have been roundly criticized, by many modern historians for delaying the presentation for a week, as if they had to meet some Divinely ordained time schedule. The reason for the delay was obvious, to prevent the French President Poincarre from colluding with the Russian foreign minister Sazanov, in the Russo-French summit that month. (McMeekin 2013, p. 124) This delay, by the Austrians was both prudent, and well within their right. Why on earth should Austria-Hungary allow two potential enemies the considerable advantage of jointly planning offensive moves meant to destroy their country? The very contention is absurd. What also needs to be remembered is that Austria-Hungary, as the injured party, had a right to present its demands when it was ready to do so.

Modern historians have also universally sanctioned the Dual Monarchy for the short time frame allowed for a response to the demarche, only 48 hours. This indicates, in their minds, that Austria-Hungary clearly wanted war. (Morton p. 283 & 303 McMeekin, p. 117) The reader is asked to leave aside, for the moment, the fact that the Serbs had repeatedly refused to investigate the crime for nearly for over 3 weeks, before the Demarche was presented.

The consequential fact is the actual Demarche, in the original French language, is only 1931 words long, and, if you throw in the annex, the entire document is 2296 words long. Conversely, pairing it down to its bare bones, the actual operational section of the document, the 10 points, contain only 385 words. (Maury, 2014) It certainly was not Tolstoy's War and Peace. In fact, the Serbian Prime Minister had ample time to compose two separate replies to it. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 198) What is also neglected by modern historians is that Austria-Hungary did not declare war immediately upon the Demarche's rejection. Franz Joseph patiently allotted the Serbs additional time to change their minds and avert a war. From the presentation of the Demarche, four and three-quarters days, or 114 hours, in total, were provided to Serbia, to present a satisfactory response to the Austrians demands. This is significantly greater than the 48 hours complained of in modern histories.

3. The Terms of the Demarche and their Rejection

The main criticism of the Demarche has always been that it was intentionally written to be impossible for Serbia to accept. However, the Serbian Prime Minister Pasic appeared to be on the point of accepting Austria-Hungary's terms, and had composed a reply to that effect. On July 24, 1914, Pasic even represented agreement to all of the terms, in principal, to the diplomatic legations accredited to Serbia. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 198-199)

Of course, the Serb Prime Minister Pasic was no stranger to lying, insisting until his death that he had no knowledge of the assassination attempt, despite clear and abundant evidence to the contrary. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 94-97). So it was second nature for him to have answered Vienna and the rest of the world out of both sides of his mouth. In this case, Pasic could have simply been deceptively overstating his willingness to accommodate Vienna, to impress the accredited diplomats in Belgrade. Thus, by seeming to be agreeable, Pasic could have just been laying the groundwork for a more favorable opinion of his rejection of Austria's terms.

However, Pasic might also have been influenced by the Russian Foreign Minister. Sazanov, who, after having confirmed French support, offered unconditional support, from Russia to Serbia, against any Austrian-Hungarian action, and without any consideration of the involvement of Serbia in the assassination. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 356) Further, as it has previously been mentioned in this account, Pasic may have had more enemies in Belgrade than in Vienna, and an accommodation of Austria-Hungary could have been fatal for him and his regime. Colonel Dimitrijevic and his followers would have been happy to repeat their performances in the 1903 revolt, should the Serb government submit to Vienna's demands. (Albertini, Volume 2, p284) At this point, whether intentionally dishonest, personally emboldened by Russian support, or fearful of a coup led by the Black Hand, Pasic rewrote his reply, trying to make it look like he was accepting Austrian terms, when he was rejecting them. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 369)

The key sticking point was, again, Austria's demand for a judicial inquiry into the crime. Since the Serbs had stonewalled the investigation for a full month, refusing, in direct contravention of international law, reasonable requests for an investigation, Austria-Hungary also demanded that her agents be allowed to participate in the police investigation. (Albertini, Volume 2, p.369)

The Serbs, in their reply, stated that they would immediately begin a judicial inquiry into the Serbian origins of the crime, {which, to this very day, has never happened} but that their constitution did not allow for foreign participation in the judicial proceedings. (Albertini, Volume 2, p.369) Specifically, in the original French language version, Austria-Hungary demanded the immediate judicial inquiry / trial, (*enquête judiciaire*), against the participants in the assassination that were within Serb territory, and that agents of Austria-Hungary must be allowed to participate in the related investigation, (*recherches*). (Maury, 2014) The Serbs, in a masterpiece of disingenuous behavior, insisted that their constitution did not allow foreign participation in the judicial inquiry (*enquête judiciaire*). Even someone who is untutored in French, can see that the only way the two terms could be confounded is through monumental, willful duplicity.

The bottom line is that the Austrian-Hungarian terms can hardly be described as being too strenuous, if the Serbs felt obliged to rewrite them, thus making the demands more harsh, before they could justify rejecting them.

Some modern historians, having realized how ridiculous Pasic's rejection of the Austrian Demarche sounds, have sought to rewrite the Serb reply, so that the Serbs can be seen as denying Austrian demands for police powers in Serbia, rather than an Austrian demand for judicial participation, that was clearly never made. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 142) (Batakovic p.349) This secondary defense would still require an extraordinarily creative translation of the original French, a la Prime Minister Pasic, to twist, prendront part aux recherches y relatives, {participate in the related (police) investigation.} into Austria-Hungary's agents having police powers, or conducting independent investigations, in Serbia.

Mind, Austria-Hungary had specifically asked only to participate {prendront part aux} in the related investigation, {recherches y relatives}, not to run the investigation or have police powers. {This is directly from Professor Maury's kind posting of the Demarche in its original and authoritative French version} (Maury, 2014) Unless you are being particularly obtuse, this means to the reader, that Vienna was asking for what we would today consider to be normal international police cooperation, the right to observe searches and interrogations, and have supervised access to evidence.

The only hope left open to the modern historians, who advance the police powers narrative, is that the reader will assume that international police cooperation was non-existent in 1914, and that it is valid to assume that Austria-Hungary was therefore demanding police powers to independently investigate and arrest Serb nationals in their own country. Unfortunately for that narrative, there is abundant evidence of how common international police cooperation was at the beginning of the twentieth century, putting the lie to this contention.

4. International Police Cooperation

I therefore cabled to my friend, Wilson Hargreave, of the New York Police Bureau, who has more than once made use of my knowledge of London crime. I asked him whether the name of Abe Slaney was known to him. Here is his reply: 'The most dangerous crook in Chicago.' (Doyle, The Adventure of the Dancing Men, p., 449)

What has eluded modern historians, is that international police cooperation was not extraordinary in 1914. Quite to the contrary, as the fictional Sherlock Holmes relates above, by 1903, it was a normal, well established practice in fictional literature, and therefore, in the minds of the general public. A quick review of published books and article on actual police cooperation, currently available, confirms that by the 1870's, police departments cooperated internationally, albeit in ad hoc arrangements. By 1889, the Criminological-Anthropological Congress, in Paris, drew in well over 100 participants from 22 separate countries. (Knepper, p. 164) In the decade preceding the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, there had been seven conferences on international police cooperation, and, embarrassingly for the allies, four of them had been held in the allied capitals of Paris, St. Petersburg and London. {The British capital hosted two consecutive conventions in 1911 & 1912} There were also conferences in Turin, Cologne and Monaco. (Knepper, p.114,

157, 159, 192 & 212) Also, famously, a NYPD Detective Lieutenant, Joseph Petrosino, was murdered in Italy on March 12, 1909, while on a mission to cooperate with Italian authorities against the Mafia. (Sauchelli, & Rosenbaum, 2014)

As you can see, international police cooperation was a well-developed concept by 1914, and the Austrian-Hungarian authorities were asking for nothing objectionable, at that time, or this. In fact, if Austria-Hungary had wanted to have obtained any extraordinary police powers, they would have had to ask for them, specifically, in the Demarche, which Franz Joseph's government did not do.

A final point should be examined. As the reader now knows, the Austrians were cognizant that a host of mid-level Royal Serbian Army officers and bureaucrats had been involved in the planning and organization of the crime in Sarajevo. The Serbs had spent 3 weeks adamantly denying all of the well-founded requests to investigate the crime. To the reasoned mind, this clearly denotes that the Serbian government had motive and inclination to obstruct any investigation. Yet the post-World War II modern historians insist that Austria-Hungary's demand for police participation in the investigation, in order to keep things honest, was unreasonable.

5. Lord Grey's View of the Austrian Terms versus British Boer War Ultimatum

The Post-World War II modern historians almost always falls back to one thing, when they are making the general case regarding the Austrian-Hungarian terms being intentionally designed to be impossible for Serbia to meet. (McMeekin p.142) (Morton, p.301) They ubiquitously quote Lord Grey, who, as the British Foreign Minister, insisted that the Demarche was “the most formidable document ever addressed by one state to another”. (Morton, p.301) (McMeekin, 2013, p.204) This is truly ungenerous of the modern historians, taking advantage of Lord Grey's apparent premature senility. Only 15 years before, when Grey was cutting his parliamentary teeth as an opposition back-bencher in the House of Commons, the British government made demands of two nations, that were so exacting as to destroy the national sovereignty of England's victims, for half a century, and so arrogantly dismissive as to have immediately instigated a war.

You see, British politicians, in the absence of any provocation, such as the Sarajevo outrage, demanded that the Afrikaners of the Orange Free State and the Republic of South Africa enfranchise English squatters, so that the British could steal South African gold by ballots, instead of bullets. The Afrikaner's just and immediate refusal to be cowed, led the English to choose the latter solution, thus starting the Second Boer War. (Taylor, p.378-387)

Surely, the dispassionate reader can see that Austria-Hungary's terms to Serbia, in 1914, were exponentially less rigorous than the British demands of 1899, in the face of infinitely greater provocation to Franz Joseph's dual monarchy, as opposed to Queen Victoria's Empire. The Afrikaners weren't running weapons to Irish rebels, which they instigated and organized. The Kingdom of Serbia certainly was fomenting insurrection in Bosnia, with Major Tonkoscic's Comitadjis. (Austrian Red Book, Vol. 2 page 51 & 54) Further, the Boers did not assassinate Edward, Prince of Wales. But one supposes that, to Lord Grey, the formidability of a declaration is conjugal; my demands are never formidable, your demands may be formidable, their

demands always are formidable. But then, Lord Grey was always much better at issuing profundities, than guiding British foreign policy.

6. What Austrian-Hungarian Terms Would Have Been “Reasonable”

You'll get results, Inspector, by always putting yourself in the other fellow's place, and thinking what you would do yourself. It takes some imagination, but it pays. (Doyle, The Adventure of the Retired Colourman, p. 978)

If we consider, just for a moment, however, the modern historians contention that the Austrian demands were unreasonable, the question is then begged, what demands would have been reasonable? What is the modern historians' alternative? Do Otte, Morton and McMeekin actually believe, after all this, that Serbia would have been capable of, or inclined towards, an honest and impartial investigation? Tuchman and Taylor have long since passed beyond this veil of tears, but their writings certainly offered no serious suggestions on this point. Doesn't the pronouncement of unreasonableness, regarding the Demarche, made by modern historians, mandate that they provide a reasonable alternative?

Seriously, after the disguised warnings, denials, counter-stories, fraud, and outright lies emanating from Belgrade, are the Austrians really supposed to be stupid enough, or weak enough, or cowardly enough to have actually allowed Serbia to investigate the crime on its own? Are the Austrians really supposed to smile and nod obligingly, while the Serbian fox guards the hen-house? Under those circumstance, the ownership of the white wash concession, in 1914 Belgrade, would have made a person into the Balkan's equivalent of J. P. Morgan.

The modern historian certainly could not suggest that the Austrians should have accepted a third party to undertake the investigation. Foreign agents cannot participate in police investigations in Serbia. The Serbs just said their constitution would not permit such an undertaking. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 369) Leaving that aside, Austria was the injured party, and had a right to a complete answer on their own terms, first hand, to the Dual Monarchy's satisfaction. Austria-Hungary's citizens had been murdered, her domestic tranquility had been trampled under by Serbs. To have injected any third party into the investigation, would have been a greater violation of Austrian-Hungarian sovereignty than anything they proposed to the Serbs.

The fact is that no modern historian, in the past 70 years, has ever provided any indication of what would have been acceptable terms, which would have, at once, satisfied the Serbs' delicate sensibilities, fragile constitution and the frail law of criminal procedure, yet still ascertained the identities of the criminals behind Franz Ferdinand's assassination, residing in Serbia.

While the joint investigation demand was the most significant term rejected, it wasn't the only one. The Serbs partially accepted three terms, three others were written evasively to avoid a response, and they openly lied to the Austrians about detaining the assassination organizer, Ciganovic, who police officials had smuggled out of Serbia, to America, This was a fact that the Austrian's were already aware of, and which adds another considerable amount of guilt and complicity to the Serbs balance sheet. (Albertini, Vol 2, p. 370)

V. MOBILIZATIONS

As everyone knows, things went downhill from the disingenuous Serbian rejection of the Demarche. Barbara Tuchman was very fond of mobilization tables and cited them repeatedly in her book, "The Guns of August" as the causative factor in the War. (Tuchman, p. 23, p. 49, et cetera) Let's look at the mobilizations she neglected.

- 24 July 1914, The Army of the Russian Empire secretly begins full mobilization. {Willy-Nicky telegrams notwithstanding} (McMeekin, 2011, p. 59 & 61)
- 25 July, Serbia Mobilizes at 3:00 pm. It rejects the Demarche, formally, 3 hours later. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 200 & 229)
- 26 July 1914, UK – The Royal Navy, after completing their annual exercises, are kept on a war footing by Winston Churchill. The Royal Navy begins loading the highest grade coal, and combat loads of ammunition on their ships. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 229) (Morton, p. 307)
- 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary mobilizes and declares war on Serbia. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 386) (Moore, et al p.760) (Morton, p. 310)

If Austria-Hungary was as desirous of war, as many historians claim, certainly they would have mobilized before the other Allied powers.

Upon receiving the rejection of the Demarche, Baron Giesl, the Austrian Ambassador notified the Serbian Government that diplomatic relations were, at that point, severed. The embassy staff grabbed their already packed bags and proceeded to the Belgrade railway station. At 6:40 p.m. local time, July 25th, 1914, Baron Giesl and his retinue entered Hungarian territory at the border village of Semlin. The Baron stepped out of the train and telegraphed confirmation of the safe removal of his staff and the severing of diplomatic relations. (Albertini, volume 2, p. 374) Had the Austrian-Hungarian Empire wanted war, the artillery bombardment of Belgrade should have started almost immediately thereafter. But it did not.

As previously mentioned, Austria-Hungary had planned to issue a formal ultimatum to Serbia after the rejection of the Demarche. Yet, Austria did not issue an ultimatum, nor did the war begin on the 25th, the 26th, the 27th, Only on the 28th did Austria-Hungary declared war, without issuing the planned ultimatum.

This change in plans was quite understandable. Serbian troops had crossed into Hungary on the 27th, near the border town of Temes Kubin, and then returned to their own territory. (Albertini, Vol. 2, p. 461) While it is not the excuse for war, that some have represented it to be, it did demonstrate that the Serbs were massing their troops on the border, which, in combination with the then obvious mobilization of Russian forces, manifested a demonstrable threat to the Dual Monarchy. The Austrians having given a peaceful solution every reasonable opportunity, finally declared war.

VI INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 1914 AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S DECLARATION OF WAR

The primary purpose of this article has been to address the omission or misstatement of critical facts about the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, by modern, post World War Two historians. Specifically, to this point, it has documented the existence and illustrated the importance of the Vasic/Kragujevac grenades and the sparkling, new Browning semiautomatic pistols. It has also documented the burgeoning role of international police cooperation in light of the terms of the Austrian-Hungarian demarche. To conclude this article, it is regrettably necessary to point out another material omission, that is ubiquitously made by every modern historian.

Not to put too fine a point on it, it is not the place for the historian to spout off to their readers unsupported, unsolicited, unsubstantiated opinions on international law. The modern historians AJP Taylor, Tuchman, and company, all overstep their bounds when they offer their opinions on the culpability of one nation or another. It is the job of the historian to present facts, and to permit the reader to draw their own conclusions.

Having laid out the facts, as they were known to the Austrian-Hungarian government at the point of the declaration of war, on July 28, 1914, all that is left is to consult the body of international law, as it stood immediately prior to the start of WWI, and with that guidance in hand, permit the reader to analyze, for themselves, whether the provocations offered by the Kingdom of Serbia rose to the level of Jus Ad Bellum.

To facilitate this end, the reader is recommended to the personage and the works of the esteemed academician, Lawrence Oppenheim. Doctor of Jurisprudence, the Whewell Chair of International Law at Cambridge University, from 1908, and, by naturalization, a subject of the British Realm. Naturally, being a noted scholar, he composed a compendium on his subject of expertise, with his magnum opus being entitled, "International Law, A Treatise". The second edition of this text was published in 1912, permitting it to incorporate the results of the Hague convention, yet predating the events in Sarajevo adequately, to demonstrate the understanding of international law, as it stood on the eve of World War One.

Being one of the two premier universities in the United Kingdom, Cambridge influenced scholarship around the world. So it is reasonable to accept Dr. Oppenheim, not only as a subject matter expert, but one of the world's leading scholars in his field in his time. In the spring of 1914, as the crack of Princip's practice gunshots rang out in a Belgrade park, law students from across the British Empire were cracking open Professor Oppenheim's worthy tome. (except, in Oxford, of course)

So, all that remains is to consider what the good jurist had to say about principals of international law in 1912 and select those principals which came into play in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Vienna, St Petersburg, Berlin, Paris and London in that most lamentable summer of 1914. Professor Oppenheim's own words are presented below, section by section, in their totality, {with emphasis added, for the purposes of this paper), followed by a detailed analysis of the confluence of these ideas and events in Sarajevo:

§ 149 Now if we examine the various international duties out of which responsibility of a State may rise, we find that there is a necessity for two different kinds of State responsibility to be distinguished. They may be named "original" in contradistinction to "vicarious" responsibility. I name as "original" the responsibility borne by a State for its own— that is, its Government's actions, and for such actions of the lower agents or private individuals as are performed at the Government's command or with its authorization. But States have to bear another responsibility besides that just mentioned. For States are, according to the Law of Nations, in a sense responsible for certain acts other than their own— namely, certain unauthorized injurious acts of their agents, of their subjects, and even of such aliens as are for the time living within their territory. This responsibility of States for acts other than their own I name "vicarious" responsibility. [248]

§ 150. It is, however, obvious that original and vicarious State responsibility are essentially different. Whereas the one is responsibility of a State for a neglect of its own duty, the other is not. A neglect of international legal duties by a State constitutes an international delinquency. The responsibility which a State bears for such delinquency is especially grave, and requires, apart from other especial consequences, a formal expiatory act, such as an apology at least, by the delinquent State to repair the wrong done. On the other hand, the vicarious responsibility which a State bears requires chiefly compulsion to make those officials or other individuals who have committed internationally injurious acts repair as far as possible the wrong done, and punishment, if necessary, of the wrongdoers. In case a State complies with these requirements, no blame falls upon it on account of such injurious acts. But of course, in case a State refuses to comply with these requirements, it commits thereby an international delinquency, and its hitherto vicarious responsibility turns ipso facto into original responsibility.

§ 155. International delinquencies may be committed against so many different objects that it is impossible to enumerate them. It suffices to give some striking examples. Thus a State may be injured— in regard to its independence through an unjustified intervention; in regard to its territorial supremacy through a violation of its frontier; in regard to its dignity through disrespectful treatment of its head or its diplomatic envoys; in regard to its personal supremacy through forcible naturalization of its citizens abroad; in regard to its treaty rights through an act violating a treaty; in regard to its right of protection over citizens abroad through any act that violates the body, the honour, or the property[252] of one of its citizens abroad.

§ 164. International Law imposes the duty upon every State to prevent as far as possible its own subjects, and such foreign subjects as live within its territory, from committing injurious acts against other States. A State which either intentionally and maliciously or through culpable negligence does not comply with this duty commits an international delinquency for which it has to bear original responsibility.

Naturally a definition is in order, to wit: an international delinquency is an injury committed by the Government of a State, against another State, through violation of an international legal duty, which, by its nature is an especially grave offense. (Oppenheim. § 151). The readers of this modest article, after the review of Professor Oppenheim's discourse on International Delinquencies, will have most probably and perspicaciously identified numerous serious breaches of the peace, committed by Serbia, in the period prior to World War One. However, thoroughness demands a complete enumeration.

Professor Oppenheim clearly delineates the first matter for consideration, which is, of course, to determine if the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was a product of an original or a vicarious responsibility borne by the Serbian State for the actions of its own officials (Oppenheim, §149) Naturally, it is up to the reader to determine whether the members of the Black Hand were acting as agents under their government's command, or acted independently, when they organized, equipped and paid the Sarajevo assassins. Of course, there is the previously mentioned report by a non-biased and disinterested third party, the Carnegie Institute, that unequivocally identified the Black Hand as an acknowledged agency of the Serbian Government. (Carnegie, p.169) If that point is conceded, then Serbia bears the guilt for the far more serious circumstance, the original responsibility.

Additionally, if the Royal Serbian Government was as innocent as it proclaimed itself to be, and was not the author of the plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand, then it should not have any objection whatsoever, to the discovery, arrest and removal of governmental officials, who abused the trust of their monarch and initiated an unauthorized scheme that jeopardized the safety and independence of their country. Taken in its logical context, the conspirators actions, border, if not transgress, upon the crime of treason against Serbia. These conspirators, Colonel Dimitrijevic, Major Popovic, Major Tankosic, and the bureaucrat Ciganovic, have, by their allegedly unauthorized actions, placed their nation at the very brink of a disastrous war. Prime Minister Pasic should have been dancing for joy at the prospect of having these dangerous criminals removed from the government.

Yet, Pasic employed every loathsome, disingenuous trick to avoid this felicitous outcome. As the reader has seen, his government refused, point blank, to investigate the crime, Then when pressed on the matter, Pasic changed the terms of the demand in the demarche, with the sole object of being able to reject it, and still effect some semblance of reasonable behavior. This begs the question, did Colonel Dimitrijevic authorize the assassination on his sole authority, or did he clear it with his boss, the Serbian Army Chief-of-Staff? Perhaps the plot was approved by Serbia's head of state, the prince regent, Alexander. It seems obvious that the Serb's were protecting someone far more important than a bald, arrogant, overreaching colonel. Based on this conduct, alone, a reasonable person would almost certainly conclude that Prime Minister Pasic believed that high officials in the Serbian Government were behind Franz Ferdinand's assassination, and acted accordingly to thwart this unpleasant and inconvenient discovery. If so,, per Professor Oppenheim's legal standards, Serbia owned original responsibility for the crime and, in doing so, committed the egregious and damnable international delinquency entailed in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. (Oppenheim, §149)

Of course, the Serbian government's conduct brings us to the second point. In the end, it doesn't really matter, whether the assassination was a product of the Serbian government or not. As the esteemed Professor Oppenheim points out, simply “a neglect of international legal duties by a State constitutes an international delinquency”, (Oppenheim, §150), Further on, he adds that “International Law imposes the duty upon every State to prevent as far as possible its own subjects, and such foreign subjects as live within its territory, from committing injurious acts against other States. A State which either intentionally and maliciously or through culpable negligence does not comply with this duty commits an international delinquency for which it has to bear original responsibility.” (Oppenheim, §164)

Serbia had a remarkably simple task to perform. Assuming that the assassination was not countenanced by Serbia's government, then it only had vicarious responsibility for these injurious acts. All Serbia had to do, since the wrong could not be repaired, would be to punish the wrongdoers. But, to use Dr. Oppenheim's terms, as soon as Foreign Minister Gruic refused Baron Giesl's request to investigate the assassination on June 30, 1914, Serbia's vicarious responsibility was exchanged for an original responsibility. From that point on, this neglected international duty meant that Serbia was now guilty of a demonstrable international delinquency, just as if it had planned and participated in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Essentially, by failing to investigate the crime, Serbia took ownership of the assassination, under international law. (Oppenheim, § 149 & 150)

One must also remember the non-warning warning from the Serbian Ambassador Jovanovic. Had he simply stated, in plain German or French, that the Serbian government had learned of the existence of an assassination attempt planned for Sarajevo, he would have discharged his duty appropriately. However, he meandered his way through the fateful interview with an inappropriate official, providing vague suggestions about what someone might do. Surely the failure of the Serb Ambassador rises, at the very least, to the level of culpable negligence, if not intentional maliciousness. But, the reader may judge for themselves whether Serbia placed itself beyond the pale by its actions and failures to act properly.

Of course, Serbian international delinquencies did not begin or end with the assassination. While Oppenheim states it is impossible to make an exhaustive compilation of international delinquencies, he presciently provides his readers with some “striking examples” of delinquencies. (Oppenheim, § 155)

The reader may also judge whether the Royal Serbian government had committed international delinquencies, by trying to organize and incite an insurrection within Austria-Hungary, through those previously mentioned Comitadji bands. Remember one such band had been formed and trained by our ubiquitous Major Tankosic, as early as 1907, to conduct guerrilla operations in the territory of Austria-Hungary. There is also the matter of smuggled munitions, meant to support those Comitadjis. Remember those 21 Serbian Army hand grenades found in Breka, in 1913, that permitted the Sarajevo judge to identify the grenades taken off the assassins? (Austrian Red Book, Volume 1, p. 93) Even civilian members of the Black Hand, such as Zivojin Dacic, who was, pointedly, the director of the Serbian State Printing Office, crossed into Austrian-Hungarian several times to agitate for insurrection in against the Dual Monarchy, all the while printing propagandized books to support that agitation. (Austrian Red Book, Volume 2, p. 57) This

systematic, decade-long pattern of malevolent instigation would certainly seem to qualify as unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary, another of the professor's international delinquencies. (Oppenheim, § 155)

As the reader will remember, per Princip's own confession, the three assassins crossed the frontier through the unkind offices of Major Rade Popovic, a Serbian army officer assigned to border duty. Popovic provided the three assassins with a passport to help get them across the border. They then proceeded to Loznica, Serbia, where a border guard company commander, which Princip said might have been named Pravonovic, used his troops to sneak the three assassins into Austrian territory. (Austrian Red Book, Volume 2, p. 93)

One must forgive Princip this lapse of memory. There are so many Serbian government officials involved in arranging this assassination, that one would need a playbill to keep them all straight. That being said, this conveyor belt of collusion and connivance, not only apparently meets the standard of the international delinquency of the repeated violation of a neighboring country's frontier, it also illustrates how 40 pounds of Serbian Army hand grenades came to be 140 kilometers inside Austrian territory, to be discovered in Breka in 1913. (Oppenheim, § 155) (Austrian Red Book, Volume 1, p. 93)

Returning to Professor Oppenheim's litany of international delinquencies, on March 31, 1909, as a resolution to the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, the Royal Serbian Government entered into a solemn treaty with Austria-Hungary, over the latter's annexation of the province. This treaty stated, in part, that:

Serbia recognizes that her rights were not affected by the state of affairs created in Bosnia, and states that she will accordingly accommodate herself to the decisions to be reached by the Powers in connection with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Serbia, in accepting the advice of the Great Powers, binds herself to desist from the attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation since October last, and she furthermore binds herself to alter the tendency of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live on the footing of friendly and neighborly relations with the latter in the future. (BYU, 2009)

Based upon all the evidence presented in this article, it is likely that a reasonable person would decide that this treaty clause had been constantly, intentionally, and flagrantly violated. That is why, after all, that the Austrians put this statement at the beginning of the Demarche, to lead with their most obvious and substantive point. The salient question is, did Serbia ever make a good faith effort toward meeting its agreement to end opposition to the Bosnian Annexation, or whether Serbia ever intended to live on the “footing of friendly and neighborly relations”. If one does condemn Serbia “through an act violating a treaty”, however, this would constitute the fifth distinct international delinquency on Dr. Oppenheim list, committed by Serbia, against Austria-Hungary (Oppenheim, § 155)

Well, if the reader admits and endorses the conclusion that Serbia breached the peace of Europe with any of the multitude of asserted international delinquencies, the question then becomes, how is this circumstance remedied? Obviously, serious consequences must attend such flagrant

breaches of international peace. Once more, the erudite Professor Oppenheim stands ready to supply the contemporaneous Edwardian perspective on this question.

The merits and the conditions of the special cases are, however, so different that it is impossible for the Law of Nations to prescribe once for all what legal consequences an international delinquency should have.

The only rule which is unanimously recognized by theory and practice is that out of an international delinquency arises a right for the wronged State to request from the delinquent State the performance of such expiatory acts as are necessary for a reparation of the wrong done. What kind of acts these are depends upon the special case and the discretion of the wronged State.

When the delinquent State refuses reparation of the wrong done, the wronged State can exercise such means as are necessary to enforce an adequate reparation. In case of international delinquencies committed in time of peace, such means are reprisals (including embargo and pacific blockade) and war as the case may require. (Oppenheim, § 156)

That, gentle reader, would seem to settle the matter beyond any question. It really doesn't get very much plainer than this. It has been the contention of this article, that the detailed provocations offered by Serbia, against Austria-Hungary, were just cause for war on the latter's part. If the reader concedes that Serbian citizens were involved, before the fact, in the criminal conspiracy to kill Franz Ferdinand, then it follows that Serbia had a vicarious responsibility to investigate the crime. Serbia's abject refusal, expressed by Foreign Minister Gruic's statement of June 30, 1914, converted the vicarious responsibility into an original responsibility for a wrongful act, making it an international delinquency. The next time Serbia rejected any demand from Austria-Hungary to investigate the crime, as it did, it was a refusal to make adequate reparation, and absolutely justified any reprisal Austria-Hungary chose to make, up to and including, war. (Oppenheim, § 156)

Note that modern historians choose to berate Austria-Hungary for the harshness of its terms. One goes as far as to snidely refer to the demarche as "non-ultimatum, super-ultimatum." (Morton, p. 308) But, under the very solid premise that an international delinquency existed, and that Serbia refused to remedy the delinquency, Austria-Hungary, as the injured state, had every right to issue terms, the intensity of which was governed only by the circumstances and severity of the injury, and the injured state's discretion. (Oppenheim, § 156) In this particular case, the injury could not be more severe, as the offense was the murder of the neighboring country's pending chief executive. Thus, Austria-Hungary was in a position to demand the most severe terms possible. But, as the reader has seen, Austria-Hungary did not do this, choosing instead to offer stern, but attainable terms.

In point of fact, Austria-Hungary was really under no obligation to have issued a demarche at all. As the reader has also just seen, under international law, as it stood in 1914, the Dual Monarchy could have made a very sound case for initiating hostilities immediately, in response to Serbia's neglect of its international duties. (Oppenheim, § 156) Serbia had already been given nearly a

month to repair the international delinquencies that it had committed, starting with Foreign Minister Gruic's reply to Austrian Ambassador Giesl's investigation request. Serbia had absolutely refused to do so. Austria-Hungary would have been absolutely within its rights to initiate hostilities without any further prevarication. Instead, Austria-Hungary issued its demarche, giving Serbia a last chance to resolve the matter, peacefully, which Serbia promptly rejected.

VII THE ALLIES AND JUS AD BELLUM

““You see, my dear Watson” — ... (Sherlock Holmes) propped his test-tube in the rack, and began to lecture with the air of a professor addressing his class — “it is not really difficult to construct a series of inferences, each dependent upon its predecessor and each simple in itself. If, after doing so, one simply knocks out all the central inferences and presents one’s audience with the starting-point and the conclusion, one may produce a startling, though possibly a meretricious, effect.’ (Doyle, The Adventure of the Dancing Men, p. 441)

Not only is the above quotation enjoyable prose, but it is an apt description, in part, what the modern historian has done with regard to the start of the First World War. However, rather than building up a sound line of reasoning with facts, and then removing the middle inferences, the modern historians missed critical facts, such as the Vasic grenades, the Browning pistols, the precedence for international police cooperation, and international law standards. This led them to erroneous, rather than startling insightful, conclusions, rather like a magician's trick that does not come off. Of course, the word meretricious, denoting something with the superficial appearance of value beauty, but, in reality, possessing no worth, is a bit harsh. It implies intent and malicious action, none of which can be fairly assigned to the post-World War Two modern historian, However, they are definitely guilty of the complacency of an unquestioned premise. That is why the adjudicated determination of war guilt varies so widely from modern, post-World War Two historians, and their insightful and conscientious inter-war predecessors.

This article has covered, up to now, the question of whether Austria-Hungary had satisfactory, demonstrable Jus Ad Bellum, or just reason for war, in its action against Serbia. Briefly, then, it only remains to address whether the major allied powers possessed any justification in their intervention to protect Serbia.

To commence this discourse, it is appropriate to return to that inestimable book, ”The Illustrated World History”, written in 1937 by Messrs. Hammerton & Barnes.

There can be no doubt that the Austrians were determined upon a punitive expedition into Serbia, unless Serbia acquiesced to the ultimatum, but the German civil government distinctly wanted the conflict localized and limited to a punishment of Serbia. This is in sharp contrast to the policy of Poincare and the Russians, which was clearly based upon the desire to bring about a general European war, without which the Franco-Russian ambitions could not have been in any way satisfied. The distinction between the type of war contemplated by Austria and Germany and that envisaged by France and Russia is of the utmost importance in assessing the relative responsibility of these various powers for

the general cataclysm which began during the first week in August, 1914. (Hammerton & Barnes, p. 984)

A. RUSSIA

“It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Russia had little moral ground either expressed or implied for interfering with Austria's plan to punish Serbia.” continued our Anglo-American historical team. As they noted, Russia had offered a protective alliance in 1911 to the Ottoman Turk, against the Balkan states, in return for opening the Bosphorus to them. (Hammerton & Barnes, p. 985) To that Slavonic breach of faith, one must also add Russia's promise, for the third time in 30 years, to support Austria's Bosnian annexation, again, this time in return for Austrian Support for Russian access to the same Straits. (Taylor p.238, p. 271, & p. 427) That time, however, the Austrians acted in 1908 before the Russians could, once again, renege on their pledge. As Hammerton and Barnes concluded, these facts destroy “the “Big Brother to the Serbs” argument used by the Russians in 1914 to justify intervention against Austria, to protect Serbia.” (Hammerton & Barnes, p. 985)

The Russian's never have, and probably never will, act for the benefit of anyone but the Russians. Even Taylor concedes “The Austrians believed, with justice, that the existence of their empire was threatened by the Russian plans in the Balkans”. (Taylor, p. 292) What the Russians were “protecting”, when they declared war on Austria-Hungary, was Nikolay Danilevsky's and General Nikolay Ignatyev's 40-year-old dreams of Pan-Slavism. (Albertini, Volume 1 p14) This philosophy, which is more aptly described as Pan-Russianism, envisaged all of the Slavs in Europe living together, under a single government with one language, one religion, one Tsar, et cetera. Coincidentally, the benevolent and selfless Russians were eagerly desirous of imposing ...er supplying their absolute monarch, their language and religion to their poor, deprived Slavic brethren to the west, whether these recipients desired this beneficence or not.

As McMeekin contends in the aptly named “Russian Origins of World War One.” even prior to Pasic's reply, Russia was mobilizing, not only against Austria, but, was also mobilizing troops designated to conduct operations against the Ottoman's, with an eye toward siezing the Bosphorus Straits, once and for all. (McMeekin, 2011, p.59) It is to be noted, however, the Ottoman Empire did not even border Serbia in 1914. The two countries were separated by the entire width of the Kingdom of Bulgaria. The Turks were not even allies, at that time, with either Austria-Hungary or Germany, and they certainly posed no threat to the Serbs, nor the Russians. So there was not even a pretense of an excuse for Russian mobilization against the Turks.

It is left for the reader to conclude, therefore, whether Russia was trying to protect their little Serb brothers or was bent on conquest, against both the Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. To the Russians, the reasonable reader may well conclude, Serbia was an excuse for conquest and not a benevolent cause. In that far more reasonable construct of the facts, Russia wanted nothing less than hegemony over Europe, with an empire which would span, no doubt, from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic. Thus, Russia was motivated solely by pure, naked aggression.

B. FRANCE

Turning to the French, during the Bosnian question in 1909, the French told the Russians, point blank, that Russia's vital interest was not involved in Serbia's conflict with Austria, and the French government could not justify a conflict over this matter, to their people. (Taylor p.453) This slap in Russia's covetous face was energetically answered over the next few years, by the newly demoted Baron Izvolsky. Due to the Bosnian fiasco, he had involuntarily descended from the lofty post as Russia's Foreign Minister to the comfortable exile as the Tsarist ambassador to France. (McMeekin, 2013, p.55) Izvolsky blamed the Austrians for his plummeting fortunes, {rather than his own ineptness}, and began distributing large sums of Rubles to influence key French newspaper editors and fund anti-German politicians. Izvolsky's crowning achievement was the election of the radical warmonger, Raymond Poincare to the French presidency in 1913. (Hammerton & Barnes p. 978-979) When Russia publicly announced its already ongoing mobilization, at the end of July, 1914, Izvolsky proudly proclaimed "Cest mon Guerre", - {This is my war}. (Hammerton & Barnes, p. 987) One supposes, this boasting ceased when the sound of German artillery became audible in Paris.

According to the modern historian's oft-repeated canard, Germany issued Austria-Hungary a blank check to deal with Serbia, once and for all. If that was the case, then the French, by comparison, opened a joint checking account with the Russians and left the Tsar with the check book. Where Germany tried to stop and then localize the conflict, the French continued to egg the Russians on toward war, encouraging Russia to speed up her mobilization. (Hammerton & Barnes p. 984 & p. 986)

Further, President Poincare knew very well that France had no obligation to mobilize in support of Russia or Serbia. The 1892 Entente agreement required France to aid Russia, only if the Austrians or Germans initiated a general mobilization against Russia, first. As previously mentioned, in 1914, Russia had ordered a full mobilization well in advance of Germany or Austria. (Hammerton & Barnes p. 984 & p. 986) If Poincare, under these circumstances, had referred the question of war to the Chamber of Deputies, he certainly would have lost the initiative, if not the outright decision to go to war. However, Poincare, under his own authority, circumvented the French constitution and bypassed the Chamber of Deputies, to get the war which he, as a vengeful Alsatian, wanted. (Hammerton & Barnes p. 988)

C. GREAT BRITAIN

"There, Mr. Holmes, you take me into regions of high international politics. But if you consider the European situation you will have no difficulty in perceiving the motive. The whole of Europe is an armed camp. There is a double league which makes a fair balance of military power. Great Britain holds the scales. If Britain were driven into war with one confederacy, it would assure the supremacy of the other confederacy," (Doyle, The Adventure of the Second Stain, p. 569)

The moral low point of allied conduct, however, was manifested by the British Foreign Minister, Lord Grey. It is a sad commentary, indeed, that a writer of detective fiction had a better comprehension of European policy, than the foreign minister of Great Britain. Yet, the very year Arthur Conan-Doyle penned the above quotation, in 1904, the British Foreign Minister, Lord

Grey, blithely entangled his countries affairs with those of Russia and France, by wedding Britannia to the Entente. No longer independent, England was shackled to a confederation which had strictly aggressive, offensive aims. (Taylor, pages 335-337) Now, England would have to answer for the whims of the Quai d'Orsay, and defend the excesses of Tsarist Russia, with Tommy Atkins' blood. What did Grey obtain for this sacrifice of independence? French acceptance of full English title to Egypt, which Paris would not have been able to challenge in a thousand years. (Taylor, p.413) Other than that, all Lord Grey got, was a security blanket, with which to assuage his Germanophobia. As Taylor admitted, to Grey "every German move was interpreted as a bid for Continental hegemony." (Taylor, p.438)

But returning to 1914, Germany receives vast criticism for its failure to restrain its ally, Austria-Hungary. (Hammerton & Barnes p. 975) (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 523-526) By comparison, however, Grey's efforts to restrain his allies were, for all practical purposes, non-existent. Either he was somnambulist or he willfully turned a blind eye to the Russian mobilization and the French support of it. The former bespeaks of a level of incompetence that had, heretofore, never been demonstrated in European diplomacy. The latter imparts a willful, cognizant connivance with his other allies to initiate a general war.

Even in Albertini's book, reason and judgment are confounded by Grey's conduct, and, that exhaustive text tried to justify Grey with his own circular logic. Grey stated that England could not let the French fight alone, despite the desires of the people and the Parliament. What afrighted Grey, far more than the hundreds of thousands of dead English soldiers, was that Russia and France would initiate a fight with Germany, relying on England's support, but not receiving it. (Albertini, Volume 2, p. 643) Of course, if Grey had not offered England's support, constantly, surreptitiously and unequivocally, to the Russian-French alliance, there is little doubt that there would have been a war, requiring England's support in the first place.

Of course, Grey had also repeatedly denied, in parliament, the existence of any formal understanding or agreement between England and France. (Hammerton & Barnes, p.975) Somehow, Grey had forgotten his written pledge to protect the French Atlantic Coast, in the event of war between France and Germany, the Grey-Cambon letters, (McMeekin, 2013, p. 72) Apparently, these documents, in the dubious opinion of Lord Grey, did not rise to the level of an agreement. In fact, English plans for intervention on behalf of France were so thorough and detailed that the billeting of each battalion of six British divisions had already been prearranged. (McMeekin, 2013, p. 73)

True to his word, when the British Cabinet proposed neutrality in the pending war, Grey threatened to resign in support of the "nonexistent" treaties. (McMeekin 2013 p.359) Grey had simply agreed to too much in the Grey-Cambon letters and other arrangements, to back out of the war, even if England's allies were provoking the conflict. The German Ambassador, Fürst {Prince} Lichnowski, presented Lord Grey every possible opportunity to stay out of the war, on August 1, 1914. The Germans promised England a guarantee of Belgian neutrality in return for English neutrality. When that was rejected by Grey, the Germans added guarantees of the preservation of French territorial, colonial and fiscal integrity. Again, Grey refused the offer. Finally, the German Ambassador invited Lord Grey to name his terms, At that point, again, Grey declined to consider any offer. (British Foreign Office, p. 260-261) And then, Lord Grey went to

the parliament, faced his colleagues, and disavowed the existence of these offers, stating, instead, that he was merely asked by Lichnowsky whether England would remain neutral if France did. (British Foreign Office, p. 250) And, with that, Grey plunged his nation into war.

The demonstrable fact is that none of the allied powers, Russia, France or England, were under any treaty obligation to act in the Austrian-Serbian Crisis. Even if there had been any treaty, those obligations certainly would not have indemnified the Serbs against open, flagrant breeches of international law. Further, none of the allied powers received any injury, nor suffered any breach of International Law, to provoke the mobilizations which they undertook. Yet each, in their turn, mobilized, menaced and provoked the Central Powers into a needless and senseless conflict.

D. AN ALTERNATE EXPLANATION OF ALLIED ACTION

Why, demands the sensible reader, would the Entente powers undertake such an action, and cause such horrors, if not to protect Serbia? This is easily explained, so long as one divorces the cataclysmic reality of the First World War from the results anticipated by the belligerent factions in the Russian, French and British governments, which were initiating the conflict. The motivation of the Entente powers was their belief that they had a quick and decisive victory within their grasp. Going back to our old friend, General Clausewitz, the allies distilled the wrong lessons from history. The Austrian Army, in its last war in Europe, was badly beaten by the Prussians in 1866, at the battle of Königgrätz. in what became known as the Seven Weeks War. (Albertini, Volume 1, p. 3) What the allies erroneously attributed the Austrian defeat to, was political and military weakness, instead of a temporary disadvantage, which arose from transient technological Prussian superiority.

The allies, presumably and literally, bet the farm that that the Austrian-Hungarian Army would collapse, again, this time. Then, the upstart Germans would have to face the combined might of Europe alone. As Grand Duchess Anastasia, the wife of Grand Duke Nicolas, commander-in-chief of the St. Petersburg Military District, and cousin to his namesake, the Tsar, summed up Allied expectations, when she told the French President, Poincare, “There's going to be war. There'll be nothing left of Austria. You're going to get back Alsace and Lorraine. Our armies will meet in Berlin. Germany will be destroyed.” (McMeekin, 2013, p.163) A more succinct distillation of allied war goals, cannot be imagined.

A funny thing happened, however, on the way to the Allied victory parade. Austria-Hungary, those inconsiderate blighters, didn't collapse as planned. Their army, though unarguably poorly led by Feldmarschall Conrad von Hötzendorf, stayed in the field, and got by with help from their German allies. In 1917, while the French Army was in open mutiny, with Russian troops torn between open flight, insubordination and revolution, Austrian troops were in Belgrade and Bucharest and preparing to drive on Kiev. Without America to bail her out, England might very well have found herself, deservedly alone, and in precisely the position the allies had planned for Germany, in 1914.

VIII SUMMATION

“It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” (Doyle, The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, p261)

The reader has been presented with evidence that support the following contentions: That the Kingdom of Serbia had committed an international delinquency by failing to adequately warn Austria-Hungary of an impending military attack, which is what the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was, and which the highest levels of the Serbian government were cognizant of, before it occurred. A second Serbian international delinquency arose from having its own senior government officials coordinate and organize the attack. A third international delinquency developed from Serbia's repeated refusal to investigate the attack, which was compounded by their facilitating the escape of one of the planners of the assassination, Ciganovic. Fourth, that Serbia had repeatedly, intentionally and illegally violated Austrian Hungarian territory for the purpose of subverting its government and inciting revolution. Finally, that Serbia openly violated a treaty in which it solemnly pledged to restrain from committing the above international delinquencies. The reader also has consumed the standards of international law in 1912. If the reader concurs with the conclusions these facts point to, they must admit that by doing these things, the Serbian government made itself a de facto participant in the crime, essentially an accessory both before and after the attack. In the end, the impartial reader is left to make an informed decision whether, in these unanswered, non-remedied delinquencies, lies Jus Ad Bellum, and provided Austria-Hungary with a reasonable just cause to pursue a military solution against the government of Serbia. In that interpretation of events, the reader will undoubtedly conclude that the blame for the Austrian-Serbian conflict lies solely and directly in the hands of the Serbians.

The reader is also left to judge the intent and actions of Serbia's allies, the Entente powers. Evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the Russians, French and British each lacked any treaty or moral obligation to protect that outlaw state. There is very strong reason to believe that they undertook their roles in the conflict, with a crass, self-serving and hypocritical motivation to gain conquest, and/or to diminish and subordinate rival nation states. Based on the facts, no other explanation of the Entente's actions seems reasonable. Thus, it is left to the reader to judge whether the Allied Powers willfully engineered a conflict for their own benefit, grossly underestimating the durability of their opposition, in a mistake which led inevitably and catastrophically to the carnage of the First World War. Under this contention, the allies, Russia, France and England, were far from being dragged into the war, as Barbara Tuchman and other modern historians would have us believe. The allies appear to have jumped headfirst into the war, like gleeful school children leaping into the old swimming hole on the first day of summer vacation.

What is beyond contention, however, is that Austria-Hungary's patience was at an end. Repeated requests to Serbia to institute an internal investigation into the crime had been met with contempt. A reasonable demand for normal, accepted international police participation in the assassination investigation, which had demonstrably originated in Serbia, had been met with a dishonest reply. Austrian forbearance had been met with dishonesty and defiance. War between the two countries was the inevitable result.

In closing, the reader is asked to look at the matter again, granting a reasonable benefit of the doubt to the accused and departed nation state, Austria-Hungary. The reader is asked to remember that it was the most pacific great power in Europe, the only great power that had, in 1914, no territorial ambitions in Europe, and no colonial adventures overseas. This nation, and its citizens, were convinced that they had no choice but war. Their emperor, Franz Joseph, the most experienced monarch in European history, who only wanted to live out the last years of his reign in peace, also felt that he had no choice but war. It is from this perspective that the post World War II modern historians assertion that Austria-Hungary instigated the First World War should be judged, in light of the evidence provided in this article.

The final questions of whether Austria-Hungary had *jus ad bellum* in engaging in a regional conflict against Serbia, or whether the allies had any moral right to escalate that regional conflict into a world war, is left to the conscience of now fully informed reader.

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